kernel.sys.v5.15
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCYS3lRQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc oqH9AP999iWN7nOOr4QpnQZVMEbwYlZksdjJso0i2Nd87rNMWQEAgKYsnm00dlLm uV/X21a9W6RJYgOGP4+BY4DAyVezpgk= =vSMk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'kernel.sys.v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull set_user() update from Christian Brauner: "This contains a single fix to set_user() which aligns permission checks with the corresponding fork() codepath. No one involved in this could come up with a reason for the difference. A capable caller can already circumvent the check when they fork where the permission checks are already for the relevant capabilities in addition to also allowing to exceed nproc when it is the init user. So apply the same logic to set_user()" * tag 'kernel.sys.v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds
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commit
e55f0c439a
1 changed files with 2 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -480,7 +480,8 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)
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* failure to the execve() stage.
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*/
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if (is_ucounts_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
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new_user != INIT_USER)
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new_user != INIT_USER &&
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!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
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else
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current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
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