There are a few spelling mistakes in the Kconfig comments and help text.
Fix these.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207155004.171962-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=hf4L
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'kvmarm-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 updates for Linux 5.11
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
The GHCB specification requires the hypervisor to save the address of an
AP Jump Table so that, for example, vCPUs that have been parked by UEFI
can be started by the OS. Provide support for the AP Jump Table set/get
exit code.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The memblock code ignores any memory that doesn't fit in the
linear mapping. In order to preserve the distance between two physical
memory locations and their mappings in the linear map, any hole between
two memory regions occupies the same space in the linear map.
On most systems, this is hardly a problem (the memory banks are close
together, and VA_BITS represents a large space compared to the available
memory *and* the potential gaps).
On NUMA systems, things are quite different: the gaps between the
memory nodes can be pretty large compared to the memory size itself,
and the range from memblock_start_of_DRAM() to memblock_end_of_DRAM()
can exceed the space described by VA_BITS.
Unfortunately, we're not very good at making this obvious to the user,
and on a D05 system (two sockets and 4 nodes with 64GB each)
accidentally configured with 39bit VA, we display something like this:
[ 0.000000] NUMA: NODE_DATA [mem 0x1ffbffe100-0x1ffbffffff]
[ 0.000000] NUMA: NODE_DATA [mem 0x2febfc1100-0x2febfc2fff]
[ 0.000000] NUMA: Initmem setup node 2 [<memory-less node>]
[ 0.000000] NUMA: NODE_DATA [mem 0x2febfbf200-0x2febfc10ff]
[ 0.000000] NUMA: NODE_DATA(2) on node 1
[ 0.000000] NUMA: Initmem setup node 3 [<memory-less node>]
[ 0.000000] NUMA: NODE_DATA [mem 0x2febfbd300-0x2febfbf1ff]
[ 0.000000] NUMA: NODE_DATA(3) on node 1
which isn't very explicit, and doesn't tell the user why 128GB
have suddently disappeared.
Let's add a warning message telling the user that memory has been
truncated, and offer a potential solution (bumping VA_BITS up).
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201215152918.1511108-1-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This function uses irq_to_desc() and is going to be used by modules to
replace the open coded irq_to_desc() (ab)usage. The final goal is to remove
the export of irq_to_desc() so driver cannot fiddle with it anymore.
Move it into the core code and fixup the usage sites to include the proper
header.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201210194042.548936472@linutronix.de
* pm-sleep:
PM: sleep: Add dev_wakeup_path() helper
PM / suspend: fix kernel-doc markup
PM: sleep: Print driver flags for all devices during suspend/resume
* pm-acpi:
PM: ACPI: Refresh wakeup device power configuration every time
PM: ACPI: PCI: Drop acpi_pm_set_bridge_wakeup()
PM: ACPI: reboot: Use S5 for reboot
* pm-domains:
PM: domains: create debugfs nodes when adding power domains
PM: domains: replace -ENOTSUPP with -EOPNOTSUPP
* powercap:
powercap: Adjust printing the constraint name with new line
powercap: RAPL: Add AMD Fam19h RAPL support
powercap: Add AMD Fam17h RAPL support
powercap/intel_rapl_msr: Convert rapl_msr_priv into pointer
x86/msr-index: sort AMD RAPL MSRs by address
Add address-cells & size-cells to DSI nodes so that board files do not
need to define them.
Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201215104657.802264-58-tomi.valkeinen@ti.com
The DSI command mode panel is no longer specific
to OMAP and thus the config option has been renamed
slightly.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201215104657.802264-50-tomi.valkeinen@ti.com
When building with W=1, GCC complains that we haven't defined prototypes
for a number of non-static functions in entry-common.c:
| arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:203:25: warning: no previous prototype for 'el1_sync_handler' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
| 203 | asmlinkage void noinstr el1_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:377:25: warning: no previous prototype for 'el0_sync_handler' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
| 377 | asmlinkage void noinstr el0_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:447:25: warning: no previous prototype for 'el0_sync_compat_handler' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
| 447 | asmlinkage void noinstr el0_sync_compat_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
... and so automated build systems using W=1 end up sending a number of
emails, despite this not being a real problem as the only callers are in
entry.S where prototypes cannot matter.
For similar cases in entry-common.c we added prototypes to
asm/exception.h, so let's do the same thing here for consistency.
Note that there are a number of other warnings printed with W=1, both
under arch/arm64 and in core code, and this patch only addresses the
cases in entry-common.c. Automated build systems typically filter these
warnings such that they're only reported when changes are made nearby,
so we don't need to solve them all at once.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214113353.44417-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
The previous call to update_freq_counters_refs() has already updated the
per-cpu variables, don't overwrite them with the same value again.
Fixes: 4b9cf23c17 ("arm64: wrap and generalise counter read functions")
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ionela Voinescu <ionela.voinescu@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7a171f710cdc0f808a2bfbd7db839c0d265527e7.1607579234.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This makes it easy to disable building with -Werror:
$ make defconfig
$ grep WERROR .config
# CONFIG_PPC_DISABLE_WERROR is not set
CONFIG_PPC_WERROR=y
$ make disable-werror.config
GEN Makefile
Using .config as base
Merging arch/powerpc/configs/disable-werror.config
Value of CONFIG_PPC_DISABLE_WERROR is redefined by fragment arch/powerpc/configs/disable-werror.config:
Previous value: # CONFIG_PPC_DISABLE_WERROR is not set
New value: CONFIG_PPC_DISABLE_WERROR=y
...
$ grep WERROR .config
CONFIG_PPC_DISABLE_WERROR=y
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201023040002.3313371-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Sometimes we can't read an error log from OPAL, and we print an error
message accordingly. But the OPAL userspace tools seem to like retrying a
lot, in which case we flood the kernel log with a lot of messages.
Change pr_err() to pr_err_ratelimited() to help with this.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211021140.28402-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
When attempting to remove by index a set of LMBs a lot of messages are
displayed on the console, even when everything goes fine:
pseries-hotplug-mem: Attempting to hot-remove LMB, drc index 8000002d
Offlined Pages 4096
pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 2d0000000 was hot-removed
The 2 messages prefixed by "pseries-hotplug-mem" are not really
helpful for the end user, they should be debug outputs.
In case of error, because some of the LMB's pages couldn't be
offlined, the following is displayed on the console:
pseries-hotplug-mem: Attempting to hot-remove LMB, drc index 8000003e
pseries-hotplug-mem: Failed to hot-remove memory at 3e0000000
dlpar: Could not handle DLPAR request "memory remove index 0x8000003e"
Again, the 2 messages prefixed by "pseries-hotplug-mem" are useless,
and the generic DLPAR prefixed message should be enough.
These 2 first changes are mainly triggered by the changes introduced
in drmgr:
https://groups.google.com/g/powerpc-utils-devel/c/Y6ef4NB3EzM/m/9cu5JHRxAQAJ
Also, when adding a bunch of LMBs, a message is displayed in the console per LMB
like these ones:
pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 7e0000000 (drc index 8000007e) was hot-added
pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 7f0000000 (drc index 8000007f) was hot-added
pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 800000000 (drc index 80000080) was hot-added
pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 810000000 (drc index 80000081) was hot-added
When adding 1TB of memory and LMB size is 256MB, this leads to 4096
messages to be displayed on the console. These messages are not really
helpful for the end user, so moving them to the DEBUG level.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Tweak change log wording]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211145954.90143-1-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
Threshold Event Counter Multiplier (TECM) is part of Monitor Mode
Control Register A (MMCRA). This field along with Threshold Event
Counter Exponent (TECE) is used to get threshould counter value.
In Power10, this is a 8bit field, so patch fixes the
current code to modify the MMCRA[TECM] extraction macro to
handle this change. ISA v3.1 says this is a 7 bit field but
POWER10 it's actually 8 bits which will hopefully be fixed
in ISA v3.1 update.
Fixes: 170a315f41 ("powerpc/perf: Support to export MMCRA[TEC*] field to userspace")
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1608022578-1532-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
According to ISAv3.1 and ISAv3.0b, the msgsndp is described to split
RB in:
msgtype <- (RB) 32:36
payload <- (RB) 37:63
t <- (RB) 57:63
The current way of getting 'msgtype', and 't' is missing their MSB:
msgtype: ((arg >> 27) & 0xf) : Gets (RB) 33:36, missing bit 32
t: (arg &= 0x3f) : Gets (RB) 58:63, missing bit 57
Fixes this by applying the correct mask.
Signed-off-by: Leonardo Bras <leobras.c@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208215707.31149-1-leobras.c@gmail.com
Fix the following coccinelle warnings:
./arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xics.c:476:3-15: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable
./arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xics.c:504:3-15: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable
Reported-by: Tosk Robot <tencent_os_robot@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <kaixuxia@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604730382-5810-1-git-send-email-kaixuxia@tencent.com
An SEV-ES guest is started by invoking a new SEV initialization ioctl,
KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. This identifies the guest as an SEV-ES guest, which is
used to drive the appropriate ASID allocation, VMSA encryption, etc.
Before being able to run an SEV-ES vCPU, the vCPU VMSA must be encrypted
and measured. This is done using the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command after all
calls to LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA have been performed, but before LAUNCH_MEASURE
has been performed. In order to establish the encrypted VMSA, the current
(traditional) VMSA and the GPRs are synced to the page that will hold the
encrypted VMSA and then LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is invoked. The vCPU is then
marked as having protected guest state.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e9643245adb809caf3a87c09997926d2f3d6ff41.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The run sequence is different for an SEV-ES guest compared to a legacy or
even an SEV guest. The guest vCPU register state of an SEV-ES guest will
be restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT. There is no need to restore the
guest registers directly and through VMLOAD before VMRUN and no need to
save the guest registers directly and through VMSAVE on VMEXIT.
Update the svm_vcpu_run() function to skip register state saving and
restoring and provide an alternative function for running an SEV-ES guest
in vmenter.S
Additionally, certain host state is restored across an SEV-ES VMRUN. As
a result certain register states are not required to be restored upon
VMEXIT (e.g. FS, GS, etc.), so only do that if the guest is not an SEV-ES
guest.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fb1c66d32f2194e171b95fc1a8affd6d326e10c1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB vCPU load/put requirements. SEV-ES
hardware will restore certain registers on VMEXIT, but not save them on
VMRUN (see Table B-3 and Table B-4 of the AMD64 APM Volume 2), so make the
following changes:
General vCPU load changes:
- During vCPU loading, perform a VMSAVE to the per-CPU SVM save area and
save the current values of XCR0, XSS and PKRU to the per-CPU SVM save
area as these registers will be restored on VMEXIT.
General vCPU put changes:
- Do not attempt to restore registers that SEV-ES hardware has already
restored on VMEXIT.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <019390e9cb5e93cd73014fa5a040c17d42588733.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB initialization requirements for
vCPU creation and vCPU load/put requirements. This includes:
General VMCB initialization changes:
- Set a VMCB control bit to enable SEV-ES support on the vCPU.
- Set the VMCB encrypted VM save area address.
- CRx registers are part of the encrypted register state and cannot be
updated. Remove the CRx register read and write intercepts and replace
them with CRx register write traps to track the CRx register values.
- Certain MSR values are part of the encrypted register state and cannot
be updated. Remove certain MSR intercepts (EFER, CR_PAT, etc.).
- Remove the #GP intercept (no support for "enable_vmware_backdoor").
- Remove the XSETBV intercept since the hypervisor cannot modify XCR0.
General vCPU creation changes:
- Set the initial GHCB gpa value as per the GHCB specification.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <3a8aef366416eddd5556dfa3fdc212aafa1ad0a2.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV and SEV-ES guests each have dedicated ASID ranges. Update the ASID
allocation routine to return an ASID in the respective range.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d7aed505e31e3954268b2015bb60a1486269c780.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SVM host save area is used to restore some host state on VMEXIT of an
SEV-ES guest. After allocating the save area, clear it and add the
encryption mask to the SVM host save area physical address that is
programmed into the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <b77aa28af6d7f1a0cb545959e08d6dc75e0c3cba.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines how NMIs are to be handled for an SEV-ES
guest. To detect the completion of an NMI the hypervisor must not
intercept the IRET instruction (because a #VC while running the NMI will
issue an IRET) and, instead, must receive an NMI Complete exit event from
the guest.
Update the KVM support for detecting the completion of NMIs in the guest
to follow the GHCB specification. When an SEV-ES guest is active, the
IRET instruction will no longer be intercepted. Now, when the NMI Complete
exit event is received, the iret_interception() function will be called
to simulate the completion of the NMI.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5ea3dd69b8d4396cefdc9048ebc1ab7caa70a847.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The guest FPU state is automatically restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT
by the hardware, so there is no reason to do this in KVM. Eliminate the
allocation of the guest_fpu save area and key off that to skip operations
related to the guest FPU state.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <173e429b4d0d962c6a443c4553ffdaf31b7665a4.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-ES guests do not currently support SMM. Update the has_emulated_msr()
kvm_x86_ops function to take a struct kvm parameter so that the capability
can be reported at a VM level.
Since this op is also called during KVM initialization and before a struct
kvm instance is available, comments will be added to each implementation
of has_emulated_msr() to indicate the kvm parameter can be null.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <75de5138e33b945d2fb17f81ae507bda381808e3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since many of the registers used by the SEV-ES are encrypted and cannot
be read or written, adjust the __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to take into
account whether the VMSA/guest state is encrypted.
For __get_sregs(), return the actual value that is in use by the guest
for all registers being tracked using the write trap support.
For __set_sregs(), skip setting of all guest registers values.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <23051868db76400a9b07a2020525483a1e62dbcf.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not
recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and
the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is
located in the encrypted register state.
SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides
intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new
EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the
hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER.
Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER
write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For an SEV-ES guest, string-based port IO is performed to a shared
(un-encrypted) page so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or
write to it and each see the contents.
For string-based port IO operations, invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the operation using common KVM port IO support.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <9d61daf0ffda496703717218f415cdc8fd487100.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For an SEV-ES guest, MMIO is performed to a shared (un-encrypted) page
so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or write to it and each
see the contents.
The GHCB specification provides software-defined VMGEXIT exit codes to
indicate a request for an MMIO read or an MMIO write. Add support to
recognize the MMIO requests and invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the MMIO operation. These routines use common KVM support
to complete the MMIO operation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <af8de55127d5bcc3253d9b6084a0144c12307d4d.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT MSR protocol
processing. The vCPU will be common for the trace events. The MSR
protocol processing is guided by the GHCB GPA in the VMCB, so the GHCB
GPA will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively. Additionally, the exit event will contain the
return code for the event.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c5b3b440c3e0db43ff2fc02813faa94fa54896b0.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT processing. The vCPU
id and the exit reason will be common for the trace events. The exit info
fields will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <25357dca49a38372e8f483753fb0c1c2a70a6898.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x100 is a request for termination of the guest. The guest has
encountered some situation for which it has requested to be terminated.
The GHCB MSR value contains the reason for the request.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f3a1f7850c75b6ea4101e15bbb4a3af1a203f1dc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x004 is a request for CPUID information. Only a single CPUID
result register can be sent per invocation, so the protocol defines the
register that is requested. The GHCB MSR value is set to the CPUID
register value as per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fd7ee347d3936e484c06e9001e340bf6387092cd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x002 is a request to set the GHCB MSR value to the SEV INFO as
per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c23c163a505290a0d1b9efc4659b838c8c902cbc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a
VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is
obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs
for the VMGEXIT exit reason.
Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT
reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control
exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are
invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the
vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by
the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This is a pre-patch to consolidate some exit handling code into callable
functions. Follow-on patches for SEV-ES exit handling will then be able
to use them from the sev.c file.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5b8b0ffca8137f3e1e257f83df9f5c881c8a96a3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When a SHUTDOWN VMEXIT is encountered, normally the VMCB is re-initialized
so that the guest can be re-launched. But when a guest is running as an
SEV-ES guest, the VMSA cannot be re-initialized because it has been
encrypted. For now, just return -EINVAL to prevent a possible attempt at
a guest reset.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <aa6506000f6f3a574de8dbcdab0707df844cb00c.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When a guest is running as an SEV-ES guest, it is not possible to emulate
instructions. Add support to prevent instruction emulation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f6355ea3024fda0a3eb5eb99c6b62dca10d792bd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
