Correct some trivial warnings caused when new file unc.c
was created. For example:
In file included from fs/cifs/unc.c:11:
>> fs/cifs/cifsproto.h:44:28: warning: 'struct TCP_Server_Info' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
44 | extern int smb_send(struct TCP_Server_Info *, struct smb_hdr *,
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
When compiling with W=1 I noticed various functions that
did not follow proper style in describing (in the comments)
the parameters passed in to the function. For example:
fs/cifs/inode.c:2236: warning: Function parameter or member 'mode' not described in 'cifs_wait_bit_killable'
I did not address the style warnings in two of the six files
(connect.c and misc.c) in order to reduce risk of merge
conflict with pending patches. We can update those later.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Some witness notifications, like client move, tell the client to
reconnect to a specific IP address. In this situation the DFS failover
code path has to be skipped so clean up as much as possible the
cifs_reconnect() code.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
If the daemon starts after mounting a share, or if it crashes, this
provides a mechanism to register again.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+ Indicate if witness feature is supported
+ Indicate if witness is used when dumping tcons
+ Dumps witness registrations. Example:
Witness registrations:
Id: 1 Refs: 1 Network name: 'fs.fover.ad'(y) Share name: 'share1'(y) \
Ip address: 192.168.103.200(n)
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+ Set a handler for the witness notification messages received from the
userspace daemon.
+ Handle the resource state change notification. When the resource
becomes unavailable or available set the tcp status to
CifsNeedReconnect for all channels.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+ Define the generic netlink family commands and message attributes to
communicate with the userspace daemon
+ The register and unregister commands are sent when connecting or
disconnecting a tree. The witness registration keeps a pointer to
the tcon and has the same lifetime.
+ Each registration has an id allocated by an IDR. This id is sent to the
userspace daemon in the register command, and will be included in the
notification messages from the userspace daemon to retrieve from the
IDR the matching registration.
+ The authentication information is bundled in the register message.
If kerberos is used the message just carries a flag.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Correct references to fs/cifs/README which has been replaced by
Documentation/filesystems/admin-guide/cifs/usage.rst, and also
correct a typo.
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Add 'witness' mount option to register for witness notifications.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Register a new generic netlink family to talk to the witness service
userspace daemon.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
misc.c was getting a little large, move two of the UNC parsing relating
functions to a new C file unc.c which makes the coding of the
upcoming witness protocol patch series a little cleaner as well.
Suggested-by: Rafal Szczesniak <rafal@elbingbrewery.org>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Move the function to misc.c
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Move the function to misc.c and give it a public header.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Enable unprivileged user namespace mounts of overlayfs. Overlayfs's
permission model (*) ensures that the mounter itself cannot gain additional
privileges by the act of creating an overlayfs mount.
This feature request is coming from the "rootless" container crowd.
(*) Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt#Permission model
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
When looking up an inode on the lower layer for which the mounter lacks
read permisison the metacopy check will fail. This causes the lookup to
fail as well, even though the directory is readable.
So ignore EACCES for the "userxattr" case and assume no metacopy for the
unreadable file.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
In case the file cannot be opened with O_NOATIME because of lack of
capabilities, then clear O_NOATIME instead of failing.
Remove WARN_ON(), since it would now trigger if O_NOATIME was cleared.
Noticed by Amir Goldstein.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Comment above call already says this, but only EOPNOTSUPP is ignored, other
failures are not.
For example setting "user.*" will fail with EPERM on symlink/special.
Ignore this error as well.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Optionally allow using "user.overlay." namespace instead of
"trusted.overlay."
This is necessary for overlayfs to be able to be mounted in an unprivileged
namepsace.
Make the option explicit, since it makes the filesystem format be
incompatible.
Disable redirect_dir and metacopy options, because these would allow
privilege escalation through direct manipulation of the
"user.overlay.redirect" or "user.overlay.metacopy" xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
generic_file_splice_read() and iter_file_splice_write() will call back into
f_op->iter_read() and f_op->iter_write() respectively. These already do
the real file lookup and cred override. So the code in ovl_splice_read()
and ovl_splice_write() is redundant.
In addition the ovl_file_accessed() call in ovl_splice_write() is
incorrect, though probably harmless.
Fix by calling generic_file_splice_read() and iter_file_splice_write()
directly.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
ovl_ioctl_set_flags() does a capability check using flags, but then the
real ioctl double-fetches flags and uses potentially different value.
The "Check the capability before cred override" comment misleading: user
can skip this check by presenting benign flags first and then overwriting
them to non-benign flags.
Just remove the cred override for now, hoping this doesn't cause a
regression.
The proper solution is to create a new setxflags i_op (patches are in the
works).
Xfstests don't show a regression.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Fixes: dab5ca8fd9 ("ovl: add lsattr/chattr support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is required by open_by_handle_at(2) so check it in
ovl_decode_real_fh() as well to prevent privilege escalation for
unprivileged overlay mounts.
[Amir] If the mounter is not capable in init ns, ovl_check_origin() and
ovl_verify_index() will not function as expected and this will break index
and nfs export features. So check capability in ovl_can_decode_fh(), to
auto disable those features.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Call remap_verify_area() on the source file as well as the destination.
When called from vfs_dedupe_file_range() the check as already been
performed, but not so if called from layered fs (overlayfs, etc...)
Could ommit the redundant check in vfs_dedupe_file_range(), but leave for
now to get error early (for fear of breaking backward compatibility).
This call shouldn't be performance sensitive.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
cap_convert_nscap() does permission checking as well as conversion of the
xattr value conditionally based on fs's user-ns.
This is needed by overlayfs and probably other layered fs (ecryptfs) and is
what vfs_foo() is supposed to do anyway.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
We have no way of tracking server READ_PLUS support in pNFS for now, so
just disable it.
Reported-by: "Mkrtchyan, Tigran" <tigran.mkrtchyan@desy.de>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
If the server returns more data than we have buffer space for, then
we need to truncate and exit early.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Expanding the READ_PLUS extents can cause the read buffer to overflow.
If it does, then don't error, but just exit early.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
If a hole extends beyond the READ_PLUS read buffer, then we want to fill
just the remaining buffer with zeros. Also ignore eof...
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
The server is allowed to return a hole extent with an offset that starts
before the offset supplied in the READ_PLUS argument. Ensure that we
support that case too.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Use the existing BITS_PER_LONG macro instead of calculating the value.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
XDRBUF_SPARSE_PAGES can cause problems for the RDMA transport,
and it's easy enough to allocate enough pages for the request
up front, so do that.
Also, since we've allocated the pages anyway, use the full
page aligned length for the receive buffer. This will allow
caching of valid replies that are too large for the caller,
but that still fit in the allocated pages.
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
as we now have a full smb3_fs_context as part of the cifs superblock
we no longer need a local copy of the mount options and can just
reference the copy in the smb3_fs_context.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
and populate it during mount in cifs_smb3_do_mount()
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
none of the callers use this argument any more.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.rst for details on new mount API
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
No change to logic, just moving the enum of cifs mount parms into a header
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Continue restructuring needed for support of new mount API
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Harmonize and change all such variables to 'ctx', where possible.
No changes to actual logic.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
In the negotiate protocol preauth context, the server is not required
to populate the salt (although it is done by most servers) so do
not warn on mount.
We retain the checks (warn) that the preauth context is the minimum
size and that the salt does not exceed DataLength of the SMB response.
Although we use the defaults in the case that the preauth context
response is invalid, these checks may be useful in the future
as servers add support for additional mechanisms.
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Trivial changes to clarify confusing comment about
SPNEGO blog (and also one length comparisons in negotiate
context parsing).
Suggested-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Suggested-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
For the cifsacl mount option, we did not support sticky bits.
With this patch, we do support it, by setting the DELETE_CHILD perm
on the directory only for the owner user. When sticky bit is not
enabled, allow DELETE_CHILD perm for everyone.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
With the "cifsacl" mount option, the mode bits set on the file/dir
is converted to corresponding ACEs in DACL. However, only the
ALLOWED ACEs were being set for "owner" and "group" SIDs. Since
owner is a subset of group, and group is a subset of
everyone/world SID, in order to properly emulate unix perm groups,
we need to add DENIED ACEs. If we don't do that, "owner" and "group"
SIDs could get more access rights than they should. Which is what
was happening. This fixes it.
We try to keep the "preferred" order of ACEs, i.e. DENYs followed
by ALLOWs. However, for a small subset of cases we cannot
maintain the preferred order. In that case, we'll end up with the
DENY ACE for group after the ALLOW for the owner.
If owner SID == group SID, use the more restrictive
among the two perm bits and convert them to ACEs.
Also, for reverse mapping, i.e. to convert ACL to unix perm bits,
for the "others" bits, we needed to add the masked bits of the
owner and group masks to others mask.
Updated version of patch fixes a problem noted by the kernel
test robot.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Azure does not send an SPNEGO blob in the negotiate protocol response,
so we shouldn't assume that it is there when validating the location
of the first negotiate context. This avoids the potential confusing
mount warning:
CIFS: Invalid negotiate context offset
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Mounts to Azure cause an unneeded warning message in dmesg
"CIFS: VFS: parse_server_interfaces: incomplete interface info"
Azure rounds up the size (by 8 additional bytes, to a
16 byte boundary) of the structure returned on the query
of the server interfaces at mount time. This is permissible
even though different than other servers so do not log a warning
if query network interfaces response is only rounded up by 8
bytes or fewer.
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix multiple
warnings by explicitly adding multiple break/goto statements instead of
just letting the code fall through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
An index node can have up to c->fanout branches, all branches should be
displayed while dumping index node.
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Function ubifs_dump_sleb() is defined but unused, it can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
