Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling
syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better
performance.
In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to
the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering
needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general
way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this
must be disabled at the compilation unit level.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701082435.126596-3-xiujianfeng@huawei.com
This is a lead-up patch to enable syscall stack randomization, which
uses alloca() and makes the compiler add unconditional stack canaries
on syscall entry. In order to avoid triggering needless checks and
slowing down the entry path, the feature needs to disable stack
protector at the compilation unit level as there is no general way to
control stack protector coverage with a function attribute.
So move system_call_exception() to syscall.c to avoid affecting other
functions in interrupt.c.
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701082435.126596-2-xiujianfeng@huawei.com