We currently have 6 (!) separate naming variants to name temporary instruction
buffers that are used for code patching:
- insnbuf
- insnbuff
- insn_buff
- insn_buffer
- ibuf
- ibuffer
These are used as local variables, percpu fields and function parameters.
Standardize all the names to a single variant: 'insn_buff'.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
There are problems with running time_cpufreq_notifier() on SMP
systems.
First off, the rdtsc() called from there runs on the CPU executing
that code and not necessarily on the CPU whose sched_clock() rate is
updated which is questionable at best.
Second, in the cases when the frequencies of all CPUs in an SMP
system are always in sync, it is not sufficient to update just
one of them or the set associated with a given cpufreq policy on
frequency changes - all CPUs in the system should be updated and
that would require more than a simple transition notifier.
Note, however, that the underlying issue (the TSC rate depending on
the CPU frequency) has not been present in hardware shipping for the
last few years and in quite a few relevant cases (acpi-cpufreq in
particular) running time_cpufreq_notifier() will cause the TSC to
be marked as unstable anyway.
For this reason, make time_cpufreq_notifier() simply mark the TSC
as unstable and give up when run on SMP and only try to carry out
any adjustments otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Local APIC timer clockevent parameters can be calculated based on platform
specific methods. However the code is mostly duplicated with the interrupt
based calibration. The commit which increased the max_delta parameter
updated only one place and made the implementations diverge.
Unify it to prevent further damage.
[ tglx: Rename function to lapic_init_clockevent() and adjust changelog a bit ]
Fixes: 4aed89d6b5 ("x86, lapic-timer: Increase the max_delta to 31 bits")
Reported-by: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1556213272-63568-1-git-send-email-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
The magic macro DEF_NATIVE() in the paravirt patching code uses inline
assembly to generate a data table for patching in the native instructions.
While clever this is falling apart with LTO and even aside of LTO the
construct is just working by chance according to GCC folks.
Aside of that the tables are constant data and not some form of magic
text.
As these constructs are not subject to frequent changes it is not a
maintenance issue to convert them to regular data tables which are
initialized with hex bytes.
Create a new set of macros and data structures to store the instruction
sequences and convert the code over.
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190424134223.690835713@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Large parts of these two files are identical. Merge them together.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190424134223.603491680@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
paravirt_patch_call() currently handles patching failures inconsistently:
we generate a warning in the retpoline case, but don't in other cases where
we might end up with a non-working kernel as well.
So just convert it all to a BUG_ON(), these patching calls are *not* supposed
to fail, and if they do we want to know it immediately.
This also makes the kernel smaller and removes an #ifdef ugly.
I tried it with a richly paravirt-enabled kernel and no patching bugs
were detected.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425095039.GC115378@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
So paravirt_patch_insns() contains this gem of logic:
unsigned paravirt_patch_insns(void *insnbuf, unsigned len,
const char *start, const char *end)
{
unsigned insn_len = end - start;
if (insn_len > len || start == NULL)
insn_len = len;
else
memcpy(insnbuf, start, insn_len);
return insn_len;
}
Note how 'len' (size of the original instruction) is checked against the new
instruction, and silently discarded with no warning printed whatsoever.
This crashes the kernel in funny ways if the patching template is buggy,
and usually in much later places.
Instead do a direct BUG_ON(), there's no way to continue successfully at that point.
I've tested this patch, with the vanilla kernel check never triggers, and
if I intentionally increase the size of one of the patch templates to a
too high value the assert triggers:
[ 0.164385] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c:167!
Without this patch a broken kernel randomly crashes in later places,
after the silent patching failure.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425091717.GA72229@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When building x86 with Clang LTO and CFI, CFI jump regions are
automatically added to the end of the .text section late in linking. As a
result, the _etext position was being labelled before the appended jump
regions, causing confusion about where the boundaries of the executable
region actually are in the running kernel, and broke at least the fault
injection code. This moves the _etext mark to outside (and immediately
after) the .text area, as it already the case on other architectures
(e.g. arm64, arm).
Reported-and-tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190423183827.GA4012@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
UAPI Changes:
- uAPI "Fixes:" patch for the upcoming kernel 5.1, included here too
We have an Ack from the media folks (only current user) for this
late tweak
Cross-subsystem Changes:
- ALSA: hda: Fix racy display power access (Takashi, Chris)
Driver Changes:
- DDI and MIPI-DSI clocks fixes for Icelake (Vandita)
- Fix Icelake frequency change/locking (RPS) (Mika)
- Temporarily disable ppGTT read-only bit on Icelake (Mika)
- Add missing Icelake W/As (Mika)
- Enable 12 deep CSB status FIFO on Icelake (Mika)
- Inherit more Icelake code for Elkhartlake (Bob, Jani)
- Handle catastrophic error on engine reset (Mika)
- Shortcut readiness to reset check (Mika)
- Regression fix for GEM_BUSY causing us to report a mixed uabi-class request as not busy (Chris)
- Revert back to max link rate and lane count on eDP (Jani)
- Fix pipe BPP readout for BXT/GLK DSI (Ville)
- Set DP min_bpp to 8*3 for non-RGB output formats (Ville)
- Enable coarse preemption boundaries for Gen8 (Chris)
- Do not enable FEC without DSC (Ville)
- Restore correct BXT DDI latency optim setting calculation (Ville)
- Always reset context's RING registers to avoid running workload twice during reset (Chris)
- Set GPU wedged on driver unload (Janusz)
- Consolidate two similar barries from timeline into one (Chris)
- Only reset the pinned kernel contexts on resume (Chris)
- Wakeref tracking improvements (Chris, Imre)
- Lockdep fixes for shrinker interactions (Chris)
- Bump ready tasks ahead of busywaits in prep of semaphore use (Chris)
- Huge step in splitting display code into fine grained files (Jani)
- Refactor the IRQ init/reset macros for code saving (Paulo)
- Convert IRQ initialization code to uncore MMIO access (Paulo)
- Convert workarounds code to use uncore MMIO access (Chris)
- Nuke drm_crtc_state and use intel_atomic_state instead (Manasi)
- Update SKL clock-gating WA (Radhakrishna, Ville)
- Isolate GuC reset code flow (Chris)
- Expose force_dsc_enable through debugfs (Manasi)
- Header standalone compile testing framework (Jani)
- Code cleanups to reduce driver footprint (Chris)
- PSR code fixes and cleanups (Jose)
- Sparse and kerneldoc updates (Chris)
- Suppress spurious combo PHY B warning (Vile)
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190418080426.GA6409@jlahtine-desk.ger.corp.intel.com
AMD family 17h Models 10h-2Fh may report a high number of L1 BTB MCA
errors under certain conditions. The errors are benign and can safely be
ignored. However, the high error rate may cause the MCA threshold
counter to overflow causing a high rate of thresholding interrupts.
In addition, users may see the errors reported through the AMD MCE
decoder module, even with the interrupt disabled, due to MCA polling.
Clear the "Counter Present" bit in the Instruction Fetch bank's
MCA_MISC0 register. This will prevent enabling MCA thresholding on this
bank which will prevent the high interrupt rate due to this error.
Define an AMD-specific function to filter these errors from the MCE
event pool so that they don't get reported during early boot.
Rename filter function in EDAC/mce_amd to avoid a naming conflict, while
at it.
[ bp: Move function prototype to the internal header and
massage/cleanup, fix typos. ]
Reported-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "clemej@gmail.com" <clemej@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Cc: Shirish S <Shirish.S@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: c95b323dcd: x86/MCE/AMD: Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding on all family 0x15 models
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: 30aa3d26ed: x86/MCE/AMD: Carve out the MC4_MISC thresholding quirk
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: 9308fd4074: x86/MCE: Group AMD function prototypes in <asm/mce.h>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325163410.171021-2-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
Some systems may report spurious MCA errors. In general, spurious MCA
errors may be disabled by clearing a particular bit in MCA_CTL. However,
clearing a bit in MCA_CTL may not be recommended for some errors, so the
only option is to ignore them.
An MCA error is printed and handled after it has been added to the MCE
event pool. So an MCA error can be ignored by not adding it to that pool
in the first place.
Add such a filtering function.
[ bp: Move function prototype to the internal header and massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "clemej@gmail.com" <clemej@gmail.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Cc: "rafal@milecki.pl" <rafal@milecki.pl>
Cc: Shirish S <Shirish.S@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325163410.171021-1-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
crashkernel=xM tries to reserve memory for the crash kernel under 4G,
which is enough, usually. But this could fail sometimes, for example
when one tries to reserve a big chunk like 2G, for example.
So let the crashkernel=xM just fall back to use high memory in case it
fails to find a suitable low range. Do not set the ,high as default
because it allocates extra low memory for DMA buffers and swiotlb, and
this is not always necessary for all machines.
Typically, crashkernel=128M usually works with low reservation under 4G,
so keep <4G as default.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Cc: piliu@redhat.com
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thymo van Beers <thymovanbeers@gmail.com>
Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190422031905.GA8387@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
The kdump crashkernel low reservation is limited to under 896M even for
X86_64. This obscure and miserable limitation exists for compatibility
with old kexec-tools but the reason is not documented anywhere.
Some more tests/investigations about the background:
a) Previously, old kexec-tools could only load purgatory to memory under
2G. Eric removed that limitation in 2012 in kexec-tools:
b4f9f8599679 ("kexec x86_64: Make purgatory relocatable anywhere
in the 64bit address space.")
b) Back in 2013 Yinghai removed all the limitations in new kexec-tools,
bzImage64 can be loaded anywhere:
82c3dd2280d2 ("kexec, x86_64: Load bzImage64 above 4G")
c) Test results with old kexec-tools with old and latest kernels:
1. Old kexec-tools can not build with modern toolchain anymore,
I built it in a RHEL6 vm.
2. 2.0.0 kexec-tools does not work with the latest kernel even with
memory under 896M and gives an error:
"ELF core (kcore) parse failed"
For that it needs below kexec-tools fix:
ed15ba1b9977 ("build_mem_phdrs(): check if p_paddr is invalid")
3. Even with patched kexec-tools which fixes 2), it still needs some
other fixes to work correctly for KASLR-enabled kernels.
So the situation is:
* Old kexec-tools is already broken with latest kernels.
* We can not keep these limitations forever just for compatibility with very
old kexec-tools.
* If one must use old tools then he/she can choose crashkernel=X@Y.
* People have reported bugs where crashkernel=384M failed because KASLR
makes the 0-896M space sparse.
* Crashkernel can reserve in low or high area, it is natural to understand
low as memory under 4G.
Hence drop the 896M limitation and change crashkernel low reservation to
reserve under 4G by default.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Cc: piliu@redhat.com
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Zhimin Gu <kookoo.gu@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190421035058.943630505@redhat.com
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes:
- various tooling fixes
- kretprobe fixes
- kprobes annotation fixes
- kprobes error checking fix
- fix the default events for AMD Family 17h CPUs
- PEBS fix
- AUX record fix
- address filtering fix"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/kprobes: Avoid kretprobe recursion bug
kprobes: Mark ftrace mcount handler functions nokprobe
x86/kprobes: Verify stack frame on kretprobe
perf/x86/amd: Add event map for AMD Family 17h
perf bpf: Return NULL when RB tree lookup fails in perf_env__find_btf()
perf tools: Fix map reference counting
perf evlist: Fix side band thread draining
perf tools: Check maps for bpf programs
perf bpf: Return NULL when RB tree lookup fails in perf_env__find_bpf_prog_info()
tools include uapi: Sync sound/asound.h copy
perf top: Always sample time to satisfy needs of use of ordered queuing
perf evsel: Use hweight64() instead of hweight_long(attr.sample_regs_user)
tools lib traceevent: Fix missing equality check for strcmp
perf stat: Disable DIR_FORMAT feature for 'perf stat record'
perf scripts python: export-to-sqlite.py: Fix use of parent_id in calls_view
perf header: Fix lock/unlock imbalances when processing BPF/BTF info
perf/x86: Fix incorrect PEBS_REGS
perf/ring_buffer: Fix AUX record suppression
perf/core: Fix the address filtering fix
kprobes: Fix error check when reusing optimized probes
DEBUG_HOTPLUG_CPU0 debug feature offlines a CPU as early as possible
allowing userspace to boot up without that CPU (so that it is possible
to check for unwanted dependencies towards the offlined CPU). After
doing so it emits a "CPU %u is now offline" pr_info, which is not enough
descriptive of why the CPU was offlined (e.g., one might be running with
a config that triggered some problem, not being aware that CONFIG_DEBUG_
HOTPLUG_CPU0 is set).
Add a bit more of informative text to the pr_info, so that it is
immediately obvious why a CPU has been offlined in early boot stages.
Background:
Got to scratch my head a bit while debugging a WARNING splat related to
the offlining of CPU0. Without being aware yet of this debug option it
wasn't immediately obvious why CPU0 was being offlined by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181219151647.15073-1-juri.lelli@redhat.com
[ Merge line-broken line. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
For new Centaur CPUs the ucode will take care of the preservation of cache coherence
between CPU cores in C-states regardless of how deep the C-states are. So, it is not
necessary to flush the caches in software befor entering C3. This useless operation
will cause performance drop for the cores which share some caches with the idling core.
Signed-off-by: David Wang <davidwang@zhaoxin.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: brucechang@via-alliance.com
Cc: cooperyan@zhaoxin.com
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Cc: linux-pm@kernel.org
Cc: qiyuanwang@zhaoxin.com
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: timguo@zhaoxin.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545900110-2757-1-git-send-email-davidwang@zhaoxin.com
[ Tidy up the comment. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The "ENERGY_PERF_BIAS: Set to 'normal', was 'performance'" message triggers
on pretty much every Intel machine. The purpose of log messages with
a warning level is to notify the user of something which potentially is
a problem, or at least somewhat unexpected.
This message clearly does not match those criteria, so lower its log
priority from warning to info.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181230172715.17469-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The "vide" inline assembler is only needed on 32bit kernels for old
32bit only CPUs.
Guard it with an #ifdef so it's not included in 64bit builds.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330004743.29541-2-andi@firstfloor.org
With gcc toplevel assembler statements that do not mark themselves as .text
may end up in other sections. This causes LTO boot crashes because various
assembler statements ended up in the middle of the initcall section. It's
also a latent problem without LTO, although it's currently not known to
cause any real problems.
According to the gcc team it's expected behavior.
Always mark all the top level assembler statements as text so that they
switch to the right section.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330004743.29541-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Avoid kretprobe recursion loop bg by setting a dummy
kprobes to current_kprobe per-CPU variable.
This bug has been introduced with the asm-coded trampoline
code, since previously it used another kprobe for hooking
the function return placeholder (which only has a nop) and
trampoline handler was called from that kprobe.
This revives the old lost kprobe again.
With this fix, we don't see deadlock anymore.
And you can see that all inner-called kretprobe are skipped.
event_1 235 0
event_2 19375 19612
The 1st column is recorded count and the 2nd is missed count.
Above shows (event_1 rec) + (event_2 rec) ~= (event_2 missed)
(some difference are here because the counter is racy)
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c9becf58d9 ("[PATCH] kretprobe: kretprobe-booster")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155094064889.6137.972160690963039.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Verify the stack frame pointer on kretprobe trampoline handler,
If the stack frame pointer does not match, it skips the wrong
entry and tries to find correct one.
This can happen if user puts the kretprobe on the function
which can be used in the path of ftrace user-function call.
Such functions should not be probed, so this adds a warning
message that reports which function should be blacklisted.
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155094059185.6137.15527904013362842072.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The "event counter" was removed from rseq before it was merged upstream.
However, a few comments in the source code still refer to it. Adapt the
comments to match reality.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190305194755.2602-2-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Syntax only, no functional or semantic change.
This routine matches packages, not die, so name it thus.
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7ca18c4ae7816a1f9eda37414725df676e63589d.1551160674.git.len.brown@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add MDS to the new 'mitigations=' cmdline option.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Currently, when a new resource group is created, the allocation values
of the MBA resource are not initialized and remain meaningless data.
For example:
mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/p1
cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/schemata
MB:0=100;1=100
echo "MB:0=10;1=20" > /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/schemata
cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p1/schemata
MB:0= 10;1= 20
rmdir /sys/fs/resctrl/p1
mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/p2
cat /sys/fs/resctrl/p2/schemata
MB:0= 10;1= 20
Therefore, when the new group is created, it is reasonable to initialize
MBA resource with default values.
Initialize the MBA resource and cache resources in separate functions.
[ bp: Add newlines between code blocks for better readability. ]
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: pei.p.jia@intel.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1555499329-1170-3-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
Carve out per rdt_domain initialization code from rdtgroup_init_alloc()
into a separate function.
No functional change, make the code more readable and save us at least
two indentation levels.
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: pei.p.jia@intel.com
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1555499329-1170-2-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not*
affected by the other two MDS issues.
For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to
mitigate SMT.
However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should
not report that SMT is mitigated:
$cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Vulnerable; SMT mitigated
But rather:
Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain
All stack types on x86 64-bit have guard pages now.
So there is no point in executing probabilistic overflow checks as the
guard pages are a accurate and reliable overflow prevention.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.466354762@linutronix.de
The IRQ stack lives in percpu space, so an IRQ handler that overflows it
will overwrite other data structures.
Use vmap() to remap the IRQ stack so that it will have the usual guard
pages that vmap()/vmalloc() allocations have. With this, the kernel will
panic immediately on an IRQ stack overflow.
[ tglx: Move the map code to a proper place and invoke it only when a CPU
is about to be brought online. No point in installing the map at
early boot for all possible CPUs. Fail the CPU bringup if the vmap()
fails as done for all other preparatory stages in CPU hotplug. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.363733568@linutronix.de
Currently, the IRQ stack is hardcoded as the first page of the percpu
area, and the stack canary lives on the IRQ stack. The former gets in
the way of adding an IRQ stack guard page, and the latter is a potential
weakness in the stack canary mechanism.
Split the IRQ stack into its own private percpu pages.
[ tglx: Make 64 and 32 bit share struct irq_stack ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Maran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: "Rafael Ávila de Espíndola" <rafael@espindo.la>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.267376656@linutronix.de
Preparatory change for disentangling the irq stack union as a
prerequisite for irq stacks with guard pages.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.177558566@linutronix.de
irq_ctx_init() crashes hard on page allocation failures. While that's ok
during early boot, it's just wrong in the CPU hotplug bringup code.
Check the page allocation failure and return -ENOMEM and handle it at the
call sites. On early boot the only way out is to BUG(), but on CPU hotplug
there is no reason to crash, so just abort the operation.
Rename the function to something more sensible while at it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Cc: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.089060584@linutronix.de
irq_ctx_init() is invoked from native_init_IRQ() or from xen_init_IRQ()
code. There is no reason to have this split. The interrupt stacks must be
allocated no matter what.
Invoke it from init_IRQ() before invoking the native or XEN init
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Abraham <j.abraham1776@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.001162606@linutronix.de
The current implementation of in_exception_stack() iterates over the
exception stacks array. Most of the time this is an useless exercise, but
even for the actual use cases (perf and ftrace) it takes at least 2
iterations to get to the NMI stack.
As the exception stacks and the guard pages are page aligned the loop can
be avoided completely.
Add a initial check whether the stack pointer is inside the full exception
stack area and leave early if not.
Create a lookup table which describes the stack area. The table index is
the page offset from the beginning of the exception stacks. So for any
given stack pointer the page offset is computed and a lookup in the
description table is performed. If it is inside a guard page, return. If
not, use the descriptor to fill in the info structure.
The table is filled at compile time and for the !KASAN case the interesting
page descriptors exactly fit into a single cache line. Just the last guard
page descriptor is in the next cacheline, but that should not be accessed
in the regular case.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.543320386@linutronix.de
The debug IST stack is actually two separate debug stacks to handle #DB
recursion. This is required because the CPU starts always at top of stack
on exception entry, which means on #DB recursion the second #DB would
overwrite the stack of the first.
The low level entry code therefore adjusts the top of stack on entry so a
secondary #DB starts from a different stack page. But the stack pages are
adjacent without a guard page between them.
Split the debug stack into 3 stacks which are separated by guard pages. The
3rd stack is never mapped into the cpu_entry_area and is only there to
catch triple #DB nesting:
--- top of DB_stack <- Initial stack
--- end of DB_stack
guard page
--- top of DB1_stack <- Top of stack after entering first #DB
--- end of DB1_stack
guard page
--- top of DB2_stack <- Top of stack after entering second #DB
--- end of DB2_stack
guard page
If DB2 would not act as the final guard hole, a second #DB would point the
top of #DB stack to the stack below #DB1 which would be valid and not catch
the not so desired triple nesting.
The backing store does not allocate any memory for DB2 and its guard page
as it is not going to be mapped into the cpu_entry_area.
- Adjust the low level entry code so it adjusts top of #DB with the offset
between the stacks instead of exception stack size.
- Make the dumpstack code aware of the new stacks.
- Adjust the in_debug_stack() implementation and move it into the NMI code
where it belongs. As this is NMI hotpath code, it just checks the full
area between top of DB_stack and bottom of DB1_stack without checking
for the guard page. That's correct because the NMI cannot hit a
stackpointer pointing to the guard page between DB and DB1 stack. Even
if it would, then the NMI operation still is unaffected, but the resume
of the debug exception on the topmost DB stack will crash by touching
the guard page.
[ bp: Make exception_stack_names static const char * const ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.439944544@linutronix.de
The entry order of the TSS.IST array and the order of the stack
storage/mapping are not required to be the same.
With the upcoming split of the debug stack this is going to fall apart as
the number of TSS.IST array entries stays the same while the actual stacks
are increasing.
Make them separate so that code like dumpstack can just utilize the mapping
order. The IST index is solely required for the actual TSS.IST array
initialization.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.241588113@linutronix.de
Convert the TSS.IST setup code to use the cpu entry area information
directly instead of assuming a linear mapping of the IST stacks.
The store to orig_ist[] is no longer required as there are no users
anymore.
This is the last preparatory step towards IST guard pages.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.061686012@linutronix.de
