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Author SHA1 Message Date
Marco Elver
00e67bf030 kfence, x86: only define helpers if !MODULE
x86's <asm/tlbflush.h> only declares non-module accessible functions
(such as flush_tlb_one_kernel) if !MODULE.

In preparation of including <asm/kfence.h> from the KFENCE test module,
only define the helpers if !MODULE to avoid breaking the build with
CONFIG_KFENCE_KUNIT_TEST=m.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YQJdarx6XSUQ1tFZ@elver.google.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
2021-07-30 17:09:01 +02:00
Marco Elver
6a77d38efc kfence, x86: fix preemptible warning on KPTI-enabled systems
On systems with KPTI enabled, we can currently observe the following
warning:

  BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible
  caller is invalidate_user_asid+0x13/0x50
  CPU: 6 PID: 1075 Comm: dmesg Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4-gda4a2b1a5479-kfence_1+ #1
  Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Pro 3500 Series/2ABF, BIOS 8.11 10/24/2012
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x7f/0xad
   check_preemption_disabled+0xc8/0xd0
   invalidate_user_asid+0x13/0x50
   flush_tlb_one_kernel+0x5/0x20
   kfence_protect+0x56/0x80
   ...

While it normally makes sense to require preemption to be off, so that
the expected CPU's TLB is flushed and not another, in our case it really
is best-effort (see comments in kfence_protect_page()).

Avoid the warning by disabling preemption around flush_tlb_one_kernel().

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YGIDBAboELGgMgXy@elver.google.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210330065737.652669-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reported-by: Tomi Sarvela <tomi.p.sarvela@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-09 14:54:23 -07:00
Marco Elver
d438fabce7 kfence: use pt_regs to generate stack trace on faults
Instead of removing the fault handling portion of the stack trace based on
the fault handler's name, just use struct pt_regs directly.

Change kfence_handle_page_fault() to take a struct pt_regs, and plumb it
through to kfence_report_error() for out-of-bounds, use-after-free, or
invalid access errors, where pt_regs is used to generate the stack trace.

If the kernel is a DEBUG_KERNEL, also show registers for more information.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201105092133.2075331-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:41:02 -08:00
Alexander Potapenko
1dc0da6e9e x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86
Add architecture specific implementation details for KFENCE and enable
KFENCE for the x86 architecture. In particular, this implements the
required interface in <asm/kfence.h> for setting up the pool and
providing helper functions for protecting and unprotecting pages.

For x86, we need to ensure that the pool uses 4K pages, which is done
using the set_memory_4k() helper function.

[elver@google.com: add missing copyright and description header]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118092159.145934-2-elver@google.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103175841.3495947-3-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@purestorage.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:41:02 -08:00