Currently, an external malicious PCI device can masquerade the VID:PID
of faulty gfx devices, and thus apply iommu quirks to effectively
disable the IOMMU restrictions for itself.
Thus we need to ensure that the device we are applying quirks to, is
indeed an internal trusted device.
Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200622231345.29722-4-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
When using first-level translation for IOVA, currently the U/S bit in the
page table is cleared which implies DMA requests with user privilege are
blocked. As the result, following error messages might be observed when
passing through a device to user level:
DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3
DMAR: [DMA Read] Request device [41:00.0] PASID 1 fault addr 7ecdcd000
[fault reason 129] SM: U/S set 0 for first-level translation
with user privilege
This fixes it by setting U/S bit in the first level page table and makes
IOVA over first level compatible with previous second-level translation.
Fixes: b802d070a5 ("iommu/vt-d: Use iova over first level")
Reported-by: Xin Zeng <xin.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200622231345.29722-3-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Move all files related to the Intel IOMMU driver into its own
subdirectory.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200609130303.26974-3-joro@8bytes.org
