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linux/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
Dmitry Kasatkin 0d73a55208 ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint->mutex was eliminated.

Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.

More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file.  As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.

To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem.

Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on
close or on open.

Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
  chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
  to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
  again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
  and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
  clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
  It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
  security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.

Fixes: Commit 6552321831 ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-12-11 17:20:47 -05:00

431 lines
11 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
*
* Author:
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "ima.h"
static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = 0;
else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
#endif
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
/*
* is_ima_appraise_enabled - return appraise status
*
* Only return enabled, if not in ima_appraise="fix" or "log" modes.
*/
bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
{
return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
}
/*
* ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag
*
* Return 1 to appraise
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
int rc, offset;
u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
if (algo <= HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
offset = 1;
iint->ima_hash->xattr.sha1.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
} else {
offset = 0;
iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG;
iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo;
}
rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
&iint->ima_hash->xattr.data[offset],
(sizeof(iint->ima_hash->xattr) - offset) +
iint->ima_hash->length, 0);
return rc;
}
/* Return specific func appraised cached result */
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
enum ima_hooks func)
{
switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
return iint->ima_mmap_status;
case BPRM_CHECK:
return iint->ima_bprm_status;
case FILE_CHECK:
case POST_SETATTR:
return iint->ima_file_status;
case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
default:
return iint->ima_read_status;
}
}
static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
enum ima_hooks func,
enum integrity_status status)
{
switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
iint->ima_mmap_status = status;
break;
case BPRM_CHECK:
iint->ima_bprm_status = status;
break;
case FILE_CHECK:
case POST_SETATTR:
iint->ima_file_status = status;
break;
case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
default:
iint->ima_read_status = status;
break;
}
}
static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
enum ima_hooks func)
{
switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
break;
case BPRM_CHECK:
iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
break;
case FILE_CHECK:
case POST_SETATTR:
iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
break;
case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1:
default:
iint->flags |= (IMA_READ_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
break;
}
}
enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len)
{
struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
enum hash_algo ret;
if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
/* return default hash algo */
return ima_hash_algo;
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig))
return ima_hash_algo;
return sig->hash_algo;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
ret = xattr_value->digest[0];
if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ret;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
/* this is for backward compatibility */
if (xattr_len == 21) {
unsigned int zero = 0;
if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4))
return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
else
return HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
} else if (xattr_len == 17)
return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
break;
}
/* return default hash algo */
return ima_hash_algo;
}
int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value)
{
ssize_t ret;
ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value,
0, GFP_NOFS);
if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
/*
* ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
*
* Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'.
* Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement.
*
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, int opened)
{
static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
char *cause = "unknown";
struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
if (rc <= 0) {
if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
goto out;
cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ?
"IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash";
status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
if (opened & FILE_CREATED)
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
(!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) ||
(inode->i_size == 0)))
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
goto out;
}
status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
(status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) &&
(status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
|| (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
cause = "missing-HMAC";
else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
cause = "invalid-HMAC";
goto out;
}
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
/* first byte contains algorithm id */
hash_start = 1;
/* fall through */
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
cause = "IMA-signature-required";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
iint->ima_hash->length)
/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
*/
rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start],
iint->ima_hash->digest,
iint->ima_hash->length);
else
rc = -EINVAL;
if (rc) {
cause = "invalid-hash";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
(const char *)xattr_value, rc,
iint->ima_hash->digest,
iint->ima_hash->length);
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
} else if (rc) {
cause = "invalid-signature";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
} else {
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
break;
default:
status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
cause = "unknown-ima-data";
break;
}
out:
if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
(!xattr_value ||
xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
} else if ((inode->i_size == 0) &&
(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
(xattr_value &&
xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
op, cause, rc, 0);
} else {
ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
}
ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status);
return status;
}
/*
* ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
*/
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
int rc = 0;
/* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */
if (test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))
return;
if (iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
return;
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
if (rc < 0)
return;
inode_lock(file_inode(file));
ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
inode_unlock(file_inode(file));
}
/**
* ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
*
* Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
*
* This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
*/
void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int must_appraise;
if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
|| !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return;
must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
if (!must_appraise)
__vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (iint) {
set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
if (!must_appraise)
clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
}
}
/*
* ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima'
*
* Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
*/
static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
if (digsig)
set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
else
clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
}
int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
int result;
result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
if (result == 1) {
if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
return -EINVAL;
ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
{
int result;
result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
if (result == 1) {
ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
result = 0;
}
return result;
}