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linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c
Andrei Matei 8a021e7fa1 bpf: Simplify checking size of helper accesses
This patch simplifies the verification of size arguments associated to
pointer arguments to helpers and kfuncs. Many helpers take a pointer
argument followed by the size of the memory access performed to be
performed through that pointer. Before this patch, the handling of the
size argument in check_mem_size_reg() was confusing and wasteful: if the
size register's lower bound was 0, then the verification was done twice:
once considering the size of the access to be the lower-bound of the
respective argument, and once considering the upper bound (even if the
two are the same). The upper bound checking is a super-set of the
lower-bound checking(*), except: the only point of the lower-bound check
is to handle the case where zero-sized-accesses are explicitly not
allowed and the lower-bound is zero. This static condition is now
checked explicitly, replacing a much more complex, expensive and
confusing verification call to check_helper_mem_access().

Error messages change in this patch. Before, messages about illegal
zero-size accesses depended on the type of the pointer and on other
conditions, and sometimes the message was plain wrong: in some tests
that changed you'll see that the old message was something like "R1 min
value is outside of the allowed memory range", where R1 is the pointer
register; the error was wrongly claiming that the pointer was bad
instead of the size being bad. Other times the information that the size
came for a register with a possible range of values was wrong, and the
error presented the size as a fixed zero. Now the errors refer to the
right register. However, the old error messages did contain useful
information about the pointer register which is now lost; recovering
this information was deemed not important enough.

(*) Besides standing to reason that the checks for a bigger size access
are a super-set of the checks for a smaller size access, I have also
mechanically verified this by reading the code for all types of
pointers. I could convince myself that it's true for all but
PTR_TO_BTF_ID (check_ptr_to_btf_access). There, simply looking
line-by-line does not immediately prove what we want. If anyone has any
qualms, let me know.

Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231221232225.568730-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com
2024-01-03 10:37:56 -08:00

372 lines
8.4 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Converted from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/raw_stack.c */
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include "bpf_misc.h"
SEC("socket")
__description("raw_stack: no skb_load_bytes")
__success
__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack R6 off=-8 size=8")
__naked void stack_no_skb_load_bytes(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -8; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
/* Call to skb_load_bytes() omitted. */ \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" ::: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, negative len")
__failure __msg("R4 min value is negative")
__naked void skb_load_bytes_negative_len(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -8; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = -8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, negative len 2")
__failure __msg("R4 min value is negative")
__naked void load_bytes_negative_len_2(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -8; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = %[__imm_0]; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes),
__imm_const(__imm_0, ~0)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, zero len")
__failure __msg("R4 invalid zero-sized read: u64=[0,0]")
__naked void skb_load_bytes_zero_len(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -8; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 0; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, no init")
__success __retval(0)
__naked void skb_load_bytes_no_init(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -8; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, init")
__success __retval(0)
__naked void stack_skb_load_bytes_init(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -8; \
r3 = 0xcafe; \
*(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r3; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs around bounds")
__success __retval(0)
__naked void bytes_spilled_regs_around_bounds(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -16; \
*(u64*)(r6 - 8) = r1; \
*(u64*)(r6 + 8) = r1; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 - 8); \
r2 = *(u64*)(r6 + 8); \
r0 = *(u32*)(r0 + %[__sk_buff_mark]); \
r2 = *(u32*)(r2 + %[__sk_buff_priority]); \
r0 += r2; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_mark, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_priority, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, priority))
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs corruption")
__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
__flag(BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
__naked void load_bytes_spilled_regs_corruption(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -8; \
*(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
r0 = *(u32*)(r0 + %[__sk_buff_mark]); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_mark, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark))
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs corruption 2")
__failure __msg("R3 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
__flag(BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
__naked void bytes_spilled_regs_corruption_2(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -16; \
*(u64*)(r6 - 8) = r1; \
*(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
*(u64*)(r6 + 8) = r1; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 - 8); \
r2 = *(u64*)(r6 + 8); \
r3 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
r0 = *(u32*)(r0 + %[__sk_buff_mark]); \
r2 = *(u32*)(r2 + %[__sk_buff_priority]); \
r0 += r2; \
r3 = *(u32*)(r3 + %[__sk_buff_pkt_type]); \
r0 += r3; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_mark, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_pkt_type, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type)),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_priority, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, priority))
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, spilled regs + data")
__success __retval(0)
__naked void load_bytes_spilled_regs_data(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -16; \
*(u64*)(r6 - 8) = r1; \
*(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1; \
*(u64*)(r6 + 8) = r1; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 - 8); \
r2 = *(u64*)(r6 + 8); \
r3 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
r0 = *(u32*)(r0 + %[__sk_buff_mark]); \
r2 = *(u32*)(r2 + %[__sk_buff_priority]); \
r0 += r2; \
r0 += r3; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_mark, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
__imm_const(__sk_buff_priority, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, priority))
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 1")
__failure __msg("invalid indirect access to stack R3 off=-513 size=8")
__naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_1(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -513; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 2")
__failure __msg("invalid indirect access to stack R3 off=-1 size=8")
__naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_2(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -1; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 8; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 3")
__failure __msg("R4 min value is negative")
__naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_3(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += 0xffffffff; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 0xffffffff; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 4")
__failure
__msg("R4 unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'")
__naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_4(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -1; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 0x7fffffff; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 5")
__failure
__msg("R4 unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'")
__naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_5(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -512; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 0x7fffffff; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, invalid access 6")
__failure __msg("invalid zero-sized read")
__naked void load_bytes_invalid_access_6(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -512; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 0; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("tc")
__description("raw_stack: skb_load_bytes, large access")
__success __retval(0)
__naked void skb_load_bytes_large_access(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
r2 = 4; \
r6 = r10; \
r6 += -512; \
r3 = r6; \
r4 = 512; \
call %[bpf_skb_load_bytes]; \
r0 = *(u64*)(r6 + 0); \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_skb_load_bytes)
: __clobber_all);
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";