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linux/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c
Jacob Keller 8cd8a6b17d ice: move VF overflow message count into struct ice_mbx_vf_info
The ice driver has some logic in ice_vf_mbx.c used to detect potentially
malicious VF behavior with regards to overflowing the PF mailbox. This
logic currently stores message counts in struct ice_mbx_vf_counter.vf_cntr
as an array. This array is allocated during initialization with
ice_mbx_init_snapshot.

This logic makes sense for SR-IOV where all VFs are allocated at once up
front. However, in the future with Scalable IOV this logic will not work.
VFs can be added and removed dynamically. We could try to keep the vf_cntr
array for the maximum possible number of VFs, but this is a waste of
memory.

Use the recently introduced struct ice_mbx_vf_info structure to store the
message count. Pass a pointer to the mbx_info for a VF instead of using its
VF ID. Replace the array of VF message counts with a linked list that
tracks all currently active mailbox tracking info structures.

Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
2023-03-13 10:32:32 -07:00

415 lines
14 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */
#include "ice_common.h"
#include "ice_vf_mbx.h"
/**
* ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf
* @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
* @vfid: VF ID to send msg
* @v_opcode: opcodes for VF-PF communication
* @v_retval: return error code
* @msg: pointer to the msg buffer
* @msglen: msg length
* @cd: pointer to command details
*
* Send message to VF driver (0x0802) using mailbox
* queue and asynchronously sending message via
* ice_sq_send_cmd() function
*/
int
ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval,
u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd)
{
struct ice_aqc_pf_vf_msg *cmd;
struct ice_aq_desc desc;
ice_fill_dflt_direct_cmd_desc(&desc, ice_mbx_opc_send_msg_to_vf);
cmd = &desc.params.virt;
cmd->id = cpu_to_le32(vfid);
desc.cookie_high = cpu_to_le32(v_opcode);
desc.cookie_low = cpu_to_le32(v_retval);
if (msglen)
desc.flags |= cpu_to_le16(ICE_AQ_FLAG_RD);
return ice_sq_send_cmd(hw, &hw->mailboxq, &desc, msg, msglen, cd);
}
static const u32 ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed[] = {
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB, /* BIT(0) */
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_10GB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_20GB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_25GB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB,
VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB,
};
/**
* ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl
* @adv_link_support: determines the format of the returned link speed
* @link_speed: variable containing the link_speed to be converted
*
* Convert link speed supported by HW to link speed supported by virtchnl.
* If adv_link_support is true, then return link speed in Mbps. Else return
* link speed as a VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_* casted to a u32. Note that the caller
* needs to cast back to an enum virtchnl_link_speed in the case where
* adv_link_support is false, but when adv_link_support is true the caller can
* expect the speed in Mbps.
*/
u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed)
{
/* convert a BIT() value into an array index */
u32 index = fls(link_speed) - 1;
if (adv_link_support)
return ice_get_link_speed(index);
else if (index < ARRAY_SIZE(ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed))
/* Virtchnl speeds are not defined for every speed supported in
* the hardware. To maintain compatibility with older AVF
* drivers, while reporting the speed the new speed values are
* resolved to the closest known virtchnl speeds
*/
return ice_legacy_aq_to_vc_speed[index];
return VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
}
/* The mailbox overflow detection algorithm helps to check if there
* is a possibility of a malicious VF transmitting too many MBX messages to the
* PF.
* 1. The mailbox snapshot structure, ice_mbx_snapshot, is initialized during
* driver initialization in ice_init_hw() using ice_mbx_init_snapshot().
* The struct ice_mbx_snapshot helps to track and traverse a static window of
* messages within the mailbox queue while looking for a malicious VF.
*
* 2. When the caller starts processing its mailbox queue in response to an
* interrupt, the structure ice_mbx_snapshot is expected to be cleared before
* the algorithm can be run for the first time for that interrupt. This
* requires calling ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() as well as calling
* ice_mbx_reset_vf_info() for each VF tracking structure.
*
* 3. For every message read by the caller from the MBX Queue, the caller must
* call the detection algorithm's entry function ice_mbx_vf_state_handler().
* Before every call to ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() the struct ice_mbx_data is
* filled as it is required to be passed to the algorithm.
*
* 4. Every time a message is read from the MBX queue, a tracking structure
* for the VF must be passed to the state handler. The boolean output
* report_malvf from ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() serves as an indicator to the
* caller whether it must report this VF as malicious or not.
*
* 5. When a VF is identified to be malicious, the caller can send a message
* to the system administrator.
*
* 6. The PF is responsible for maintaining the struct ice_mbx_vf_info
* structure for each VF. The PF should clear the VF tracking structure if the
* VF is reset. When a VF is shut down and brought back up, we will then
* assume that the new VF is not malicious and may report it again if we
* detect it again.
*
* 7. The function ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() is called to reset the information
* in ice_mbx_snapshot for every new mailbox interrupt handled.
*/
#define ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(rq_data) ((rq_data) & PF_MBX_ARQH_ARQH_M)
/* Using the highest value for an unsigned 16-bit value 0xFFFF to indicate that
* the max messages check must be ignored in the algorithm
*/
#define ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT 0xFFFF
/**
* ice_mbx_reset_snapshot - Reset mailbox snapshot structure
* @snap: pointer to the mailbox snapshot
*/
static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap)
{
struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info;
/* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure and setting the
* mailbox snapshot state to a new capture.
*/
memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
/* Reset message counts for all VFs to zero */
list_for_each_entry(vf_info, &snap->mbx_vf, list_entry)
vf_info->msg_count = 0;
}
/**
* ice_mbx_traverse - Pass through mailbox snapshot
* @hw: pointer to the HW struct
* @new_state: new algorithm state
*
* Traversing the mailbox static snapshot without checking
* for malicious VFs.
*/
static void
ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw,
enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state)
{
struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
u32 num_iterations;
snap_buf = &hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_buf;
/* As mailbox buffer is circular, applying a mask
* on the incremented iteration count.
*/
num_iterations = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(++snap_buf->num_iterations);
/* Checking either of the below conditions to exit snapshot traversal:
* Condition-1: If the number of iterations in the mailbox is equal to
* the mailbox head which would indicate that we have reached the end
* of the static snapshot.
* Condition-2: If the maximum messages serviced in the mailbox for a
* given interrupt is the highest possible value then there is no need
* to check if the number of messages processed is equal to it. If not
* check if the number of messages processed is greater than or equal
* to the maximum number of mailbox entries serviced in current work item.
*/
if (num_iterations == snap_buf->head ||
(snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx < ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT &&
++snap_buf->num_msg_proc >= snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx))
*new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
}
/**
* ice_mbx_detect_malvf - Detect malicious VF in snapshot
* @hw: pointer to the HW struct
* @vf_info: mailbox tracking structure for a VF
* @new_state: new algorithm state
* @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious
*
* This function tracks the number of asynchronous messages
* sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds
* the permissible number of messages to send.
*/
static int
ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info,
enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state,
bool *is_malvf)
{
/* increment the message count for this VF */
vf_info->msg_count++;
if (vf_info->msg_count >= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD)
*is_malvf = true;
/* continue to iterate through the mailbox snapshot */
ice_mbx_traverse(hw, new_state);
return 0;
}
/**
* ice_mbx_vf_state_handler - Handle states of the overflow algorithm
* @hw: pointer to the HW struct
* @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data
* @vf_info: mailbox tracking structure for the VF in question
* @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious
*
* The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF
* detection algorithm by handling the different states and state
* transitions of the algorithm:
* New snapshot: This state is entered when creating a new static
* snapshot. The data from any previous mailbox snapshot is
* cleared and a new capture of the mailbox head and tail is
* logged. This will be the new static snapshot to detect
* asynchronous messages sent by VFs. On capturing the snapshot
* and depending on whether the number of pending messages in that
* snapshot exceed the watermark value, the state machine enters
* traverse or detect states.
* Traverse: If pending message count is below watermark then iterate
* through the snapshot without any action on VF.
* Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse
* the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF.
*/
int
ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data,
struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info,
bool *is_malvf)
{
struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq;
enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state;
int status = 0;
if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data)
return -EINVAL;
/* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF
* is not malicious until detected.
*/
*is_malvf = false;
/* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current
* interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold.
*/
if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD)
return -EINVAL;
/* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit
* set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox
* nor should it be greater than the maximum number of messages in the
* mailbox serviced in current interrupt.
*/
if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD ||
mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx)
return -EINVAL;
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID;
snap_buf = &snap->mbx_buf;
switch (snap_buf->state) {
case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT:
/* Clear any previously held data in mailbox snapshot structure. */
ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap);
/* Collect the pending ARQ count, number of messages processed and
* the maximum number of messages allowed to be processed from the
* Mailbox for current interrupt.
*/
snap_buf->num_pending_arq = mbx_data->num_pending_arq;
snap_buf->num_msg_proc = mbx_data->num_msg_proc;
snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx = mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx;
/* Capture a new static snapshot of the mailbox by logging the
* head and tail of snapshot and set num_iterations to the tail
* value to mark the start of the iteration through the snapshot.
*/
snap_buf->head = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean +
mbx_data->num_pending_arq);
snap_buf->tail = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean - 1);
snap_buf->num_iterations = snap_buf->tail;
/* Pending ARQ messages returned by ice_clean_rq_elem
* is the difference between the head and tail of the
* mailbox queue. Comparing this value against the watermark
* helps to check if we potentially have malicious VFs.
*/
if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >=
mbx_data->async_watermark_val) {
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state,
is_malvf);
} else {
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state);
}
break;
case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE:
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state);
break;
case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT:
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_info, &new_state,
is_malvf);
break;
default:
new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID;
status = -EIO;
}
snap_buf->state = new_state;
return status;
}
/**
* ice_mbx_report_malvf - Track and note malicious VF
* @hw: pointer to the HW struct
* @vf_info: the mailbox tracking info structure for a VF
* @report_malvf: boolean to indicate if malicious VF must be reported
*
* This function updates the malicious indicator bit in the VF mailbox
* tracking structure. A malicious VF must be reported only once if discovered
* between VF resets or loading so the function first checks if the VF has
* already been detected in any previous mailbox iterations.
*/
int
ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info,
bool *report_malvf)
{
if (!report_malvf)
return -EINVAL;
*report_malvf = !vf_info->malicious;
vf_info->malicious = 1;
return 0;
}
/**
* ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF mailbox info
* @vf_info: the mailbox tracking structure for a VF
*
* In case of a VF reset, this function shall be called to clear the VF's
* current mailbox tracking state.
*/
void ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info)
{
vf_info->malicious = 0;
vf_info->msg_count = 0;
}
/**
* ice_mbx_init_vf_info - Initialize a new VF mailbox tracking info
* @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
* @vf_info: the mailbox tracking info structure for a VF
*
* Initialize a VF mailbox tracking info structure and insert it into the
* snapshot list.
*
* If you remove the VF, you must also delete the associated VF info structure
* from the linked list.
*/
void ice_mbx_init_vf_info(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info)
{
struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
ice_mbx_clear_malvf(vf_info);
list_add(&vf_info->list_entry, &snap->mbx_vf);
}
/**
* ice_mbx_init_snapshot - Initialize mailbox snapshot data
* @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
*
* Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and initialize the VF mailbox list.
*/
void ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw)
{
struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&snap->mbx_vf);
ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap);
}
/**
* ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot - Free mailbox snapshot structure
* @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
*
* Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and free the VF counter array.
*/
void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw)
{
struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
/* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure */
memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
}