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linux/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
Claudio Imbrenda 5cbe24350b KVM: s390: move pv gmap functions into kvm
Move gmap related functions from kernel/uv into kvm.

Create a new file to collect gmap-related functions.

Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <schlameuss@linux.ibm.com>
[fixed unpack_one(), thanks mhartmay@linux.ibm.com]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250123144627.312456-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20250123144627.312456-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
2025-01-31 12:03:52 +01:00

787 lines
21 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Common Ultravisor functions and initialization
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2019, 2024
*/
#define KMSG_COMPONENT "prot_virt"
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include <linux/bitmap.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/pagewalk.h>
#include <asm/facility.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/uv.h>
/* the bootdata_preserved fields come from ones in arch/s390/boot/uv.c */
int __bootdata_preserved(prot_virt_guest);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prot_virt_guest);
/*
* uv_info contains both host and guest information but it's currently only
* expected to be used within modules if it's the KVM module or for
* any PV guest module.
*
* The kernel itself will write these values once in uv_query_info()
* and then make some of them readable via a sysfs interface.
*/
struct uv_info __bootdata_preserved(uv_info);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(uv_info);
int __bootdata_preserved(prot_virt_host);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prot_virt_host);
static int __init uv_init(phys_addr_t stor_base, unsigned long stor_len)
{
struct uv_cb_init uvcb = {
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_INIT_UV,
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
.stor_origin = stor_base,
.stor_len = stor_len,
};
if (uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb)) {
pr_err("Ultravisor init failed with rc: 0x%x rrc: 0%x\n",
uvcb.header.rc, uvcb.header.rrc);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
void __init setup_uv(void)
{
void *uv_stor_base;
if (!is_prot_virt_host())
return;
uv_stor_base = memblock_alloc_try_nid(
uv_info.uv_base_stor_len, SZ_1M, SZ_2G,
MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_ACCESSIBLE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (!uv_stor_base) {
pr_warn("Failed to reserve %lu bytes for ultravisor base storage\n",
uv_info.uv_base_stor_len);
goto fail;
}
if (uv_init(__pa(uv_stor_base), uv_info.uv_base_stor_len)) {
memblock_free(uv_stor_base, uv_info.uv_base_stor_len);
goto fail;
}
pr_info("Reserving %luMB as ultravisor base storage\n",
uv_info.uv_base_stor_len >> 20);
return;
fail:
pr_info("Disabling support for protected virtualization");
prot_virt_host = 0;
}
/*
* Requests the Ultravisor to pin the page in the shared state. This will
* cause an intercept when the guest attempts to unshare the pinned page.
*/
int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr)
{
struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED,
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
.paddr = paddr,
};
if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_pin_shared);
/*
* Requests the Ultravisor to destroy a guest page and make it
* accessible to the host. The destroy clears the page instead of
* exporting.
*
* @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be destroyed
*/
static int uv_destroy(unsigned long paddr)
{
struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_DESTR_SEC_STOR,
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
.paddr = paddr
};
if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb)) {
/*
* Older firmware uses 107/d as an indication of a non secure
* page. Let us emulate the newer variant (no-op).
*/
if (uvcb.header.rc == 0x107 && uvcb.header.rrc == 0xd)
return 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* The caller must already hold a reference to the folio
*/
int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio)
{
int rc;
/* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */
if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
return 0;
folio_get(folio);
rc = uv_destroy(folio_to_phys(folio));
if (!rc)
clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
folio_put(folio);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(uv_destroy_folio);
/*
* The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping.
*/
int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte)
{
VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
return uv_destroy_folio(pfn_folio(pte_pfn(pte)));
}
/*
* Requests the Ultravisor to encrypt a guest page and make it
* accessible to the host for paging (export).
*
* @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be exported
*/
int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
{
struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR,
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
.paddr = paddr
};
if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_convert_from_secure);
/*
* The caller must already hold a reference to the folio.
*/
int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio)
{
int rc;
/* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */
if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
return 0;
folio_get(folio);
rc = uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio));
if (!rc)
clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
folio_put(folio);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_convert_from_secure_folio);
/*
* The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping.
*/
int uv_convert_from_secure_pte(pte_t pte)
{
VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
return uv_convert_from_secure_folio(pfn_folio(pte_pfn(pte)));
}
/*
* Calculate the expected ref_count for a folio that would otherwise have no
* further pins. This was cribbed from similar functions in other places in
* the kernel, but with some slight modifications. We know that a secure
* folio can not be a large folio, for example.
*/
static int expected_folio_refs(struct folio *folio)
{
int res;
res = folio_mapcount(folio);
if (folio_test_swapcache(folio)) {
res++;
} else if (folio_mapping(folio)) {
res++;
if (folio->private)
res++;
}
return res;
}
/**
* make_folio_secure() - make a folio secure
* @folio: the folio to make secure
* @uvcb: the uvcb that describes the UVC to be used
*
* The folio @folio will be made secure if possible, @uvcb will be passed
* as-is to the UVC.
*
* Return: 0 on success;
* -EBUSY if the folio is in writeback or has too many references;
* -E2BIG if the folio is large;
* -EAGAIN if the UVC needs to be attempted again;
* -ENXIO if the address is not mapped;
* -EINVAL if the UVC failed for other reasons.
*
* Context: The caller must hold exactly one extra reference on the folio
* (it's the same logic as split_folio())
*/
int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
{
int expected, cc = 0;
if (folio_test_large(folio))
return -E2BIG;
if (folio_test_writeback(folio))
return -EBUSY;
expected = expected_folio_refs(folio) + 1;
if (!folio_ref_freeze(folio, expected))
return -EBUSY;
set_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
/*
* If the UVC does not succeed or fail immediately, we don't want to
* loop for long, or we might get stall notifications.
* On the other hand, this is a complex scenario and we are holding a lot of
* locks, so we can't easily sleep and reschedule. We try only once,
* and if the UVC returned busy or partial completion, we return
* -EAGAIN and we let the callers deal with it.
*/
cc = __uv_call(0, (u64)uvcb);
folio_ref_unfreeze(folio, expected);
/*
* Return -ENXIO if the folio was not mapped, -EINVAL for other errors.
* If busy or partially completed, return -EAGAIN.
*/
if (cc == UVC_CC_OK)
return 0;
else if (cc == UVC_CC_BUSY || cc == UVC_CC_PARTIAL)
return -EAGAIN;
return uvcb->rc == 0x10a ? -ENXIO : -EINVAL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(make_folio_secure);
/*
* To be called with the folio locked or with an extra reference! This will
* prevent gmap_make_secure from touching the folio concurrently. Having 2
* parallel arch_make_folio_accessible is fine, as the UV calls will become a
* no-op if the folio is already exported.
*/
int arch_make_folio_accessible(struct folio *folio)
{
int rc = 0;
/* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */
if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
return 0;
/*
* PG_arch_1 is used in 2 places:
* 1. for storage keys of hugetlb folios and KVM
* 2. As an indication that this small folio might be secure. This can
* overindicate, e.g. we set the bit before calling
* convert_to_secure.
* As secure pages are never large folios, both variants can co-exists.
*/
if (!test_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags))
return 0;
rc = uv_pin_shared(folio_to_phys(folio));
if (!rc) {
clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
return 0;
}
rc = uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio));
if (!rc) {
clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
return 0;
}
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_make_folio_accessible);
static ssize_t uv_query_facilities(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n%lx\n%lx\n%lx\n",
uv_info.inst_calls_list[0],
uv_info.inst_calls_list[1],
uv_info.inst_calls_list[2],
uv_info.inst_calls_list[3]);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_facilities_attr =
__ATTR(facilities, 0444, uv_query_facilities, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_supp_se_hdr_ver(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_se_hdr_ver);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_se_hdr_ver_attr =
__ATTR(supp_se_hdr_ver, 0444, uv_query_supp_se_hdr_ver, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_se_hdr_pcf);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf_attr =
__ATTR(supp_se_hdr_pcf, 0444, uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_dump_cpu_len(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.guest_cpu_stor_len);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_cpu_len_attr =
__ATTR(uv_query_dump_cpu_len, 0444, uv_query_dump_cpu_len, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_dump_storage_state_len(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.conf_dump_storage_state_len);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_storage_state_len_attr =
__ATTR(dump_storage_state_len, 0444, uv_query_dump_storage_state_len, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_dump_finalize_len(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.conf_dump_finalize_len);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_dump_finalize_len_attr =
__ATTR(dump_finalize_len, 0444, uv_query_dump_finalize_len, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_feature_indications(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.uv_feature_indications);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_feature_indications_attr =
__ATTR(feature_indications, 0444, uv_query_feature_indications, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_cpus(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_guest_cpu_id + 1);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_cpus_attr =
__ATTR(max_cpus, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_cpus, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_vms(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_num_sec_conf);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_vms_attr =
__ATTR(max_guests, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_vms, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_max_guest_addr(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.max_sec_stor_addr);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_guest_addr_attr =
__ATTR(max_address, 0444, uv_query_max_guest_addr, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_att_req_hdr_ver);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver_attr =
__ATTR(supp_att_req_hdr_ver, 0444, uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_supp_att_pflags(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_att_pflags);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_att_pflags_attr =
__ATTR(supp_att_pflags, 0444, uv_query_supp_att_pflags, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_add_secret_req_ver);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver_attr =
__ATTR(supp_add_secret_req_ver, 0444, uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_add_secret_pcf);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf_attr =
__ATTR(supp_add_secret_pcf, 0444, uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_supp_secret_types(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lx\n", uv_info.supp_secret_types);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_supp_secret_types_attr =
__ATTR(supp_secret_types, 0444, uv_query_supp_secret_types, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_max_secrets(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n",
uv_info.max_assoc_secrets + uv_info.max_retr_secrets);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_secrets_attr =
__ATTR(max_secrets, 0444, uv_query_max_secrets, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_max_retr_secrets(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_retr_secrets);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_retr_secrets_attr =
__ATTR(max_retr_secrets, 0444, uv_query_max_retr_secrets, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_query_max_assoc_secrets(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", uv_info.max_assoc_secrets);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_query_max_assoc_secrets_attr =
__ATTR(max_assoc_secrets, 0444, uv_query_max_assoc_secrets, NULL);
static struct attribute *uv_query_attrs[] = {
&uv_query_facilities_attr.attr,
&uv_query_feature_indications_attr.attr,
&uv_query_max_guest_cpus_attr.attr,
&uv_query_max_guest_vms_attr.attr,
&uv_query_max_guest_addr_attr.attr,
&uv_query_supp_se_hdr_ver_attr.attr,
&uv_query_supp_se_hdr_pcf_attr.attr,
&uv_query_dump_storage_state_len_attr.attr,
&uv_query_dump_finalize_len_attr.attr,
&uv_query_dump_cpu_len_attr.attr,
&uv_query_supp_att_req_hdr_ver_attr.attr,
&uv_query_supp_att_pflags_attr.attr,
&uv_query_supp_add_secret_req_ver_attr.attr,
&uv_query_supp_add_secret_pcf_attr.attr,
&uv_query_supp_secret_types_attr.attr,
&uv_query_max_secrets_attr.attr,
&uv_query_max_assoc_secrets_attr.attr,
&uv_query_max_retr_secrets_attr.attr,
NULL,
};
static inline struct uv_cb_query_keys uv_query_keys(void)
{
struct uv_cb_query_keys uvcb = {
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_QUERY_KEYS,
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb)
};
uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
return uvcb;
}
static inline ssize_t emit_hash(struct uv_key_hash *hash, char *buf, int at)
{
return sysfs_emit_at(buf, at, "%016llx%016llx%016llx%016llx\n",
hash->dword[0], hash->dword[1], hash->dword[2], hash->dword[3]);
}
static ssize_t uv_keys_host_key(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct uv_cb_query_keys uvcb = uv_query_keys();
return emit_hash(&uvcb.key_hashes[UVC_QUERY_KEYS_IDX_HK], buf, 0);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_keys_host_key_attr =
__ATTR(host_key, 0444, uv_keys_host_key, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_keys_backup_host_key(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct uv_cb_query_keys uvcb = uv_query_keys();
return emit_hash(&uvcb.key_hashes[UVC_QUERY_KEYS_IDX_BACK_HK], buf, 0);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_keys_backup_host_key_attr =
__ATTR(backup_host_key, 0444, uv_keys_backup_host_key, NULL);
static ssize_t uv_keys_all(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct uv_cb_query_keys uvcb = uv_query_keys();
ssize_t len = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(uvcb.key_hashes); i++)
len += emit_hash(uvcb.key_hashes + i, buf, len);
return len;
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_keys_all_attr =
__ATTR(all, 0444, uv_keys_all, NULL);
static struct attribute_group uv_query_attr_group = {
.attrs = uv_query_attrs,
};
static struct attribute *uv_keys_attrs[] = {
&uv_keys_host_key_attr.attr,
&uv_keys_backup_host_key_attr.attr,
&uv_keys_all_attr.attr,
NULL,
};
static struct attribute_group uv_keys_attr_group = {
.attrs = uv_keys_attrs,
};
static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_guest(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", prot_virt_guest);
}
static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_host(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", prot_virt_host);
}
static struct kobj_attribute uv_prot_virt_guest =
__ATTR(prot_virt_guest, 0444, uv_is_prot_virt_guest, NULL);
static struct kobj_attribute uv_prot_virt_host =
__ATTR(prot_virt_host, 0444, uv_is_prot_virt_host, NULL);
static const struct attribute *uv_prot_virt_attrs[] = {
&uv_prot_virt_guest.attr,
&uv_prot_virt_host.attr,
NULL,
};
static struct kset *uv_query_kset;
static struct kset *uv_keys_kset;
static struct kobject *uv_kobj;
static int __init uv_sysfs_dir_init(const struct attribute_group *grp,
struct kset **uv_dir_kset, const char *name)
{
struct kset *kset;
int rc;
kset = kset_create_and_add(name, NULL, uv_kobj);
if (!kset)
return -ENOMEM;
*uv_dir_kset = kset;
rc = sysfs_create_group(&kset->kobj, grp);
if (rc)
kset_unregister(kset);
return rc;
}
static int __init uv_sysfs_init(void)
{
int rc = -ENOMEM;
if (!test_facility(158))
return 0;
uv_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("uv", firmware_kobj);
if (!uv_kobj)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = sysfs_create_files(uv_kobj, uv_prot_virt_attrs);
if (rc)
goto out_kobj;
rc = uv_sysfs_dir_init(&uv_query_attr_group, &uv_query_kset, "query");
if (rc)
goto out_ind_files;
/* Get installed key hashes if available, ignore any errors */
if (test_bit_inv(BIT_UVC_CMD_QUERY_KEYS, uv_info.inst_calls_list))
uv_sysfs_dir_init(&uv_keys_attr_group, &uv_keys_kset, "keys");
return 0;
out_ind_files:
sysfs_remove_files(uv_kobj, uv_prot_virt_attrs);
out_kobj:
kobject_del(uv_kobj);
kobject_put(uv_kobj);
return rc;
}
device_initcall(uv_sysfs_init);
/*
* Find the secret with the secret_id in the provided list.
*
* Context: might sleep.
*/
static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
const struct uv_secret_list *list,
struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)
{
u16 i;
for (i = 0; i < list->total_num_secrets; i++) {
if (memcmp(secret_id, list->secrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {
*secret = list->secrets[i].hdr;
return 0;
}
}
return -ENOENT;
}
/*
* Do the actual search for `uv_get_secret_metadata`.
*
* Context: might sleep.
*/
static int find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
struct uv_secret_list *list,
struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)
{
u16 start_idx = 0;
u16 list_rc;
int ret;
do {
uv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, &list_rc, NULL);
if (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED && list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {
if (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)
return -ENODEV;
else
return -EIO;
}
ret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);
if (ret == 0)
return ret;
start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA && start_idx < list->next_secret_idx);
return -ENOENT;
}
/**
* uv_get_secret_metadata() - get secret metadata for a given secret id.
* @secret_id: search pattern.
* @secret: output data, containing the secret's metadata.
*
* Search for a secret with the given secret_id in the Ultravisor secret store.
*
* Context: might sleep.
*
* Return:
* * %0: - Found entry; secret->idx and secret->type are valid.
* * %ENOENT - No entry found.
* * %ENODEV: - Not supported: UV not available or command not available.
* * %EIO: - Other unexpected UV error.
*/
int uv_get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)
{
struct uv_secret_list *buf;
int rc;
buf = kzalloc(sizeof(*buf), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = find_secret(secret_id, buf, secret);
kfree(buf);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_get_secret_metadata);
/**
* uv_retrieve_secret() - get the secret value for the secret index.
* @secret_idx: Secret index for which the secret should be retrieved.
* @buf: Buffer to store retrieved secret.
* @buf_size: Size of the buffer. The correct buffer size is reported as part of
* the result from `uv_get_secret_metadata`.
*
* Calls the Retrieve Secret UVC and translates the UV return code into an errno.
*
* Context: might sleep.
*
* Return:
* * %0 - Entry found; buffer contains a valid secret.
* * %ENOENT: - No entry found or secret at the index is non-retrievable.
* * %ENODEV: - Not supported: UV not available or command not available.
* * %EINVAL: - Buffer too small for content.
* * %EIO: - Other unexpected UV error.
*/
int uv_retrieve_secret(u16 secret_idx, u8 *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
struct uv_cb_retr_secr uvcb = {
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_RETR_SECRET,
.secret_idx = secret_idx,
.buf_addr = (u64)buf,
.buf_size = buf_size,
};
uv_call_sched(0, (u64)&uvcb);
switch (uvcb.header.rc) {
case UVC_RC_EXECUTED:
return 0;
case UVC_RC_INV_CMD:
return -ENODEV;
case UVC_RC_RETR_SECR_STORE_EMPTY:
case UVC_RC_RETR_SECR_INV_SECRET:
case UVC_RC_RETR_SECR_INV_IDX:
return -ENOENT;
case UVC_RC_RETR_SECR_BUF_SMALL:
return -EINVAL;
default:
return -EIO;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_retrieve_secret);