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linux/security/landlock/net.c
Mikhail Ivanov 854277e2cc
landlock: Fix non-TCP sockets restriction
Use sk_is_tcp() to check if socket is TCP in bind(2) and connect(2)
hooks.

SMC, MPTCP, SCTP protocols are currently restricted by TCP access
rights.  The purpose of TCP access rights is to provide control over
ports that can be used by userland to establish a TCP connection.
Therefore, it is incorrect to deny bind(2) and connect(2) requests for a
socket of another protocol.

However, SMC, MPTCP and RDS implementations use TCP internal sockets to
establish communication or even to exchange packets over a TCP
connection [1]. Landlock rules that configure bind(2) and connect(2)
usage for TCP sockets should not cover requests for sockets of such
protocols. These protocols have different set of security issues and
security properties, therefore, it is necessary to provide the userland
with the ability to distinguish between them (eg. [2]).

Control over TCP connection used by other protocols can be achieved with
upcoming support of socket creation control [3].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/62336067-18c2-3493-d0ec-6dd6a6d3a1b5@huawei-partners.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241204.fahVio7eicim@digikod.net/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240904104824.1844082-1-ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com/

Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/40
Fixes: fff69fb03d ("landlock: Support network rules with TCP bind and connect")
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250205093651.1424339-2-ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com
[mic: Format commit message to 72 columns]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2025-02-14 09:23:09 +01:00

182 lines
5 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
*
* Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
* Copyright © 2022-2023 Microsoft Corporation
*/
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
#include "limits.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "ruleset.h"
int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights)
{
int err;
const struct landlock_id id = {
.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port),
.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
};
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
return err;
}
static const struct access_masks any_net = {
.net = ~0,
};
static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
struct sockaddr *const address,
const int addrlen,
access_mask_t access_request)
{
__be16 port;
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
const struct landlock_rule *rule;
struct landlock_id id = {
.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
};
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
landlock_get_applicable_domain(landlock_get_current_domain(),
any_net);
if (!dom)
return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
return -EACCES;
if (!sk_is_tcp(sock->sk))
return 0;
/* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */
if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_INET:
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case AF_INET6:
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
break;
#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
default:
return 0;
}
/* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */
if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
/*
* Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
* association, which have the same effect as closing the
* connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
* descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
* connections is always allowed.
*
* For a TCP access control system, this request is legitimate.
* Let the network stack handle potential inconsistencies and
* return -EINVAL if needed.
*/
if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
return 0;
/*
* For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
* accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
* INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
* required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
* -EAFNOSUPPORT.
*
* We could return 0 and let the network stack handle these
* checks, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
* consistency thanks to kselftest.
*/
if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
/* addrlen has already been checked for AF_UNSPEC. */
const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
(struct sockaddr_in *)address;
if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_INET)
return -EINVAL;
if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
} else {
/*
* Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return
* -EACCES instead of -EINVAL. Valid sa_family changes are
* only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC.
*
* We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this
* check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
* consistency thanks to kselftest.
*/
if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family)
return -EINVAL;
}
id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id);
access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, access_request, &layer_masks,
ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen)
{
return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
}
static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock,
struct sockaddr *const address,
const int addrlen)
{
return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
}
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
};
__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
&landlock_lsmid);
}